Coronavirus test for military organisation in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY 2020-09-16. by Darczewska, Jolanta
CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES www.osw.waw.pl
OSW Commentary
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw,  Poland
tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, info@osw.waw.pl
             www.osw.waw.pl
NUMBER 351  16.09.2020
EDITORS: Wojciech Konończuk, Tomasz Strzelczyk,
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Szymon Sztyk
TRANSLATION: Jon Tappenden
DTP: Urszula Gumińska-Kurek
The views expressed by the authors of the papers 
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities.
Civil crisis management at an end 
in Russia?
The body responsible for crisis management 
is EMERCOM, which has an official headcount 
of 288,500. The central apparatus controls the 
local structures spread around the Russian Fed-
eration’s administrative units. Since 2008, the 
body responsible for coordinating their activi-
ties has been the National Crisis Management 
Centre (NCMC). In emergency situations, the 
NCMC also takes charge of the activities of the 
agencies involved in dealing with them, from 
local government through the communications, 
transport, and health ministries and the Rospot-
riebnadzor sanitary regulator to the Ministry 
of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, Rosgvardi-
ya, etc. Its duties include monitoring threats, 
operating the threat notification systems, and 
organising paramedic services. Military rescue 
units are also part of the civil defence forces 
under EMERCOM control, which are deployed 
for instance to deal with radiological, chemical, 
and biological contamination. 
Coronavirus test for military organisation in Russia 
Jolanta Darczewska
The Kremlin defines the role of the Russian Federation as a superpower in the international arena in 
terms of the strength it can bring to bear due to its resources, and this is the backdrop for the Kremlin’s 
plans to integrate the capacities of the ‘forces ministries’ into a coherent state military organisation. 
The system, which was created to mobilise the various resources, and develop a capacity for them to 
be used flexibly to further Russia’s strategic political goals, has also been put to the test in the current 
epidemiological crisis. One form in which this has manifested itself is marginalisation of the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), which officially is in charge of coordinating crisis response operations. 
If the effectiveness of measures to deal with coronavirus is to be measured by performance of state 
institutions, the way their activities are coordinated, and public trust in the authorities, Russia has 
failed the test. Meanwhile, regardless of the flaws in military organisation of the country (the system 
being overregulated, chaotic management, multiple coordinating bodies, disjointed decision-making) 
the ‘forces ministries’ have affirmed their position as the beneficiaries under the system. The internal 
and external political goals (long-term survival of the regime, information war with the West) have 
taken precedence over social goals. The discord between propaganda and the true situation has 
exacerbated public distrust of the authorities.
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The crisis management system itself operates 
on the basis of federal law, for example laws 
on ‘states of emergency’, ‘special situations’ and 
‘protecting the population against natural dis-
asters’. A state of emergency is declared by the 
president in cases of large-scale natural disas-
ters (recently during the forest wildfires of 2010), 
while a ‘special situation’ is a situation declared 
by EMERCOM up to ten or even twenty times 
a year in cases of natural and other disasters, and 
when people’s lives and health are at risk from 
an epidemic (a ‘special situation’ was declared 
in June due to an environmental disaster in the 
Arctic; in the case of COVID-19, only a regime of 
high alert was declared). Various ministries are 
involved in enforcing compliance with procedures 
and restrictions in this case.
During the pandemic, the EMERCOM crisis man-
agement and response system described above 
was not activated for reasons for which both the 
Kremlin and EMERCOM itself were responsible. 
This was primarily due to structural reform of 
EMERCOM, which essentially has been ongoing 
since 2012, when Vladimir Puchkov took over as 
head of the ministry. Puchkov focused on the forc-
es and civil defence command system. In 2018, his 
successor, Evgeny Zinichev, continued the reform. 
Zinichev is a former bodyguard of Vladimir Putin, 
and later served as governor of Kaliningrad and 
deputy director of the FSB. Upon taking office, 
he embarked on a cleansing of personnel (at 
that time the president dismissed six EMERCOM 
generals), and at the end of 2019 he announced 
that more than 500 organisational units in the 
ministry would be closed1, and that this would go 
hand in hand with much emphasised measures 
to fight corruption and the arrest of members of 
the management of regional structures (including 
Tatarstan and the Lipetsk, Kurgan, Tver, Kemerovo, 
and Yaroslavl Oblasts).
As a result, following the outbreak of the pandem-
ic, neither the Standing Committee for Prevention 
1 М. Бондаренко, М. Юшков, ‘МЧС России решило ликвиди-
ровать более 500 своих учреждений’, РБК, 24 September 
2019, www.rbc.ru.
and Countering Special Situations, chaired by 
the head of EMERCOM, nor the NCMC2 were up 
to the task. This led the president to order fur-
ther reform – he submitted a legislative proposal 
amending the ‘Act on Protecting the Population 
against Natural Disasters’, making the NCMC part 
of EMERCOM, and no longer a unit under his con-
trol, to make it more effective. The prime minister 
was also given additional powers with regard to 
coordinating crisis response and declaring states 
of high alert and special situations3. 
The decision to relieve the authority afforded 
statutory jurisdiction of the power to coordinate 
operations ran contrary to assurances that the 
crisis response system was well prepared. The 
damage done to EMERCOM’s image was probably 
intended to be countered by a press conference 
held by Putin with governors on 27 April 2020. 
Zinichev also appeared in person at a residence in 
Novo-Ogaryovo, and, together with the president, 
analysed the situation regarding fires and flood 
prevention in the regions, emphasising the success 
achieved by the ministry. At that time, he did not 
raise the issue of dealing with COVID-19: according 
to the public statements he has made since the 
beginning of March, at the moment EMERCOM 
is primarily concerned with construction of crisis 
response centres in the Arctic and safeguarding 
northern sea route shipping4. 
2 М. Солопов, ‘Почему в России до сих пор не объявили 
режим чрезвычайной ситуации — и как его будут вво-
дить в ближайшее время’, Медуза, 31 March 2020, www.
meduza.io.
3 Source: TASS, RIA Novosti (22 April 2020). See Законопро-
ект № 931192-7 О внесении изменений в отдельные зако-
нодательные акты Российской Федерации по вопросам 
предупреждения и ликвидации чрезвычайных ситуаций, 
СОЗД ГАС «Законотворчество», sozd.duma.gov.ru.
4 This was EMERCOM’s response to the signing on 5 March 
2020 by President Putin of The Grounds for the Policy 
of the Russian Federation in the Arctic up until 2035. 
See Т. Борисов, ‘Спасение при минус сорока и ниже’, 
Российская Газета, 11 March 2020, www.rg.ru; ‘МЧС 
обеспечит безопасность реализации проектов в Ар-
ктике и мореплавания по Севморпути’, Север-Пресс, 
29 April 2020, www.sever-press.ru. Subsequently, Zinichev 
When the pandemic broke out, 
EMERCOM structures responsible 
for crisis management in Russia 
were not up to the task.
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The missing elements in the crisis management 
system were provided by the Russian Federation 
Government’s Coronavirus Coordination Coun-
cil5 (set up 14 March), headed by Prime Minister 
Mikhail Mishustin, which included the heads of all 
of the ‘forces ministries’, an operational staff cre-
ated additionally on 30 March, headed by Deputy 
Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova, which includes an 
epidemic growth information centre, and a State 
Council task force appointed by the president and 
headed by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Due 
to this task force, the ‘model’ activities of the 
authorities of the capital, which is at the epicentre 
of the outbreak (police and Rosgvardiya cordon 
around the city, patrols to enforce the system of 
passes limiting movement of residents, use of dig-
ital surveillance technology to enforce quarantine 
and lockdown), could be duplicated by regional 
authorities, which have been given responsibility 
for the success of coronavirus countermeasures in 
their jurisdictions. One of the consequences of the 
panicked response on the part of some governors, 
who stopped people entering their jurisdictions 
or parts of their jurisdictions (such as Nizhny 
Novgorod, Chechnya), and of stoppages in all of 
the industrial plants, was the blocking of some 
transportation routes and industrial chains. Some 
of the regional restrictions were lifted following 
intervention from Moscow6.
On a  central level, more activity to counter 
COVID-19 can be seen in the Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of the Interior, and Rosgvardiya than the 
ministry that has statutory responsibility for this 
matter. The Ministry of Defence has been con-
ducting tests of readiness to combat infection and 
demonstrating its bacteriological defence capacity 
emphasised the importance of the EMERCOM, declaring 
an emergency situation due to the ecological disaster in 
Norylsk, where there was a spillage of 20 000 tonnes of fuel. 
See ‘МЧС России готово обеспечивать мероприятия по 
развитию Арктических территорий и безопасному мо-
реплаванию по Северному морскому пути’, МЧС России, 
7 July 2020, www.mchs.gov.ru.
5 Координационный совет по борьбе с COVID-19, 
Стопкоронавирус.рф — Официальный интернет-
ресурс для информирования населения по вопросам 
коронавируса (COVID-19).
6 See I. Wiśniewska, ‘Gospodarka pod respiratorem. Skutki 
pandemii i załamania się cen ropy naftowej dla Rosji’, OSW 
Commentary, no. 333, 19 May 2020, www.osw.waw.pl.
in Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defence 
Forces exercises. It has also built sixteen modular 
infectious disease hospitals in the regions at risk, 
and four more are under construction. It also re-
leases daily updates on the measures it is taking 
in a special bulletin on its website7. Meanwhile, 
for the purpose of foreign policy, it organises 
‘facemask diplomacy’, one element of which is 
the much-heralded convoys with medical aid 
for Italy and Serbia. EMERCOM’s public activities 
principally amount to drafting recommendations 
and procedures to be followed during a pandemic, 
devising awareness-raising schemes to inform the 
public of the consequences of not complying with 
lockdown regulations, and disinfecting public 
infrastructure and facilities. 
Military organisation of state and crisis 
management 
The first indication that ‘civil’ crisis management 
might be at an end was a statement made by 
Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in April 2019 re-
garding plans to set up regional centres to coordi-
nate the activities of the ‘forces ministries’ during 
crisis. At that time, the Ministry of Defence signed 
a trial agreement regarding this matter with the 
governor of the Tula Oblast, former Federal De-
fence Service (FDS) general Aleksei Diumin. The 
task of the proposed centres is to monitor the 
social and economic situation, and infrastructure 
problems, in the regions. In Shoigu’s view, this 
is “a milestone in development of a state and 
defence management system8: During a crisis, 
the regional authorities will work directly with 
the Ministry of Defence and EMERCOM, as well 
as bodies responsible for protecting the legal 
system. In peacetime, the Ministry of Defence will 
be provided with reports on the social situation 
of military personnel and their families, imple-
mentation of conscription plans, etc.”.
7 See Информационный бюллетень Министерства обо-
роны Российской Федерации по недопущению распро-
странения новой коронавирусной инфекции.
8 ‘Шойгу пообещал создать во всех регионах кризисные 
центры управления’, Бизнес Online, 10 April 2019, www.
business-gazeta.ru.
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This statement demonstrated a shift in the ap-
proach to military administration as a result of 
revision of the concept of Wojennaja Organizacyja 
Gosudarstwa i Obszczestwa. While, in the past, 
this was understood as a defence system, today 
it is becoming an essential element of manage-
ment of the state. This term can be translated in 
two ways, as ‘wartime organisation’, i.e. a state 
defence system officially formulated in law, and 
‘military organisation’ (MO) of management of the 
state – militarisation of policy and administration. 
In very general terms, a broad range of military 
means and methods of operation are intended 
to be used for various political goals, as well as 
to entrench values such as civil obedience and 
subordination to the authorities. 
The currently applicable Russian Federation War-
time Doctrine of 2014 defines the term ‘wartime 
organisation of the state’ as the “entire range 
of state and military authorities, Armed Forces, 
other forces, armed formations, and bodies, and 
special formations created for times of war, on 
which those authorities are founded, and which 
operate by military means, and the country’s in-
dustrial and defence complex, jointly working to 
prepare for armed defence and to conduct armed 
defence of the Russian Federation” (point 8). The 
convoluted phrase “Armed Forces, other forces, 
armed formations, and bodies” is featured in 
practically every document regulating Russian 
national security issues and is a synonym for the 
‘forces ministries’. They have a common mission, 
which among other things is to ensure integrity of 
the state, stability of the constitutional order and 
state institutions, and social calm, take measures 
to counteract terrorism, extremism, and ethnic 
separatism, and deal with special situations such 
as epidemics and pandemics. 
A list of the ministries referred to above is given 
in article 1 of an amendment passed in 2017 to 
the federal ‘defence’ law. Under that article, in 
addition to state and military administration 
bodies, forces in which service in the military 
is envisaged also play a role in defence of the 
Russian Federation. These forces are the Armed 
Forces and other forces, rescue formations of 
the federal executive body with civil defence 
jurisdiction (EMERCOM), the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, bodies in the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
state security bodies (FSO), military prosecution 
service authorities, Russian Federation Investi-
gation Committee military investigation bodies, 
the federal authority for Russian Federation state 
authority mobilisation preparations (GUSP), and 
special formations created in case of war. 
Even in 2013, Putin was talking about the stra-
tegic priority of expanding the MO, in response 
to “changes in Russia’s international position”9. 
The president summarised the progress made in 
implementation of the MO development strategy 
for 2020 at a meeting of the Russian Federation Se-
curity Council on 22 November 201910, saying that 
the second decade had brought an “increase in 
the level of performance of the forces ministries”, 
and that the primary tasks for the third decade (up 
until 2030) were to continue that process, ensure 
that the forces ministries work together more 
closely, and that “external defence and internal 
security should be harmonised”. He pointed out in 
particular the importance of military personnel’s 
living conditions and the conditions in which they 
serve, saying that they would be improved further, 
as “People who serve in high-risk conditions, in 
which their lives are often at risk, should feel cared 
for by their Motherland, the authorities, and the 
state they serve”. Putin said that the ideal MO of 
a state “is a modern, efficiently managed, and 
9 ‘О совершенствовании военной организации Российской 
Федерации до 2020 года’, Совет Безопасности Российской 
Федерации, 5 July 2013, www.scrf.gov.ru.
10 ‘О перспективах развития Вооружённых Сил, других 
войск, воинских формирований и органов, выполняю-
щих задачи в области обороны, на период до 2030 года’, 
Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации, 22 November 
2019, www.scrf.gov.ru; ‘Заседание Совета Безопасности 
Российской Федерации’, Президент России, 22 November 
2019, www.kremlin.ru.
The measures taken by the authori-
ties in Moscow, which is at the epi-
centre of the outbreak, were dupli-
cated by regional authorities, which 
have been given responsibility for 
coronavirus countermeasures in their 
jurisdictions.
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multifunctional system with a high informational 
and analytical capacity, and with a modern com-
munication and reconnaissance capability ena-
bling individual forces ministries to work together 
closely, and the state and military authorities to 
work together closely at every level”. 
In this context, the inequality of status of bodies 
within the MO is significant. In view of the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction in matters of 
security and defence, and federal oversight of 
enforcement of the related laws, the role of local 
structures only extends to tasks assigned by the 
central authorities. For this reason, the Russian 
legislature mainly focuses on stipulating the scope 
of their responsibilities. They are required, for in-
stance, to ensure that the Armed Forces are contin-
ually supplied with power, to provide services and 
perform other tasks for the Armed Forces, other 
forces, and special formations, to perform civil 
defence and territorial defence tasks, make mo-
bilisation preparations, and gather food reserves 
for wartime. In practice, the list of duties of local 
authorities is continually getting longer, which is 
illustrated by them being given responsibility for 
counteracting coronavirus as well.
Pandemic a test for Russia’s military 
organisation
The effects of epidemics vary, and can be of a po-
litical, economic and social nature. In Russia’s case, 
there are also organisational and military effects. 
The MO epidemiological test was not a success. 
The coordination-related functions of EMERCOM, 
the ministry with statutory responsibility for coun-
teracting coronavirus, were suspended by the 
Kremlin, and responsibility for efficient anti-crisis 
measures was given to disoriented governors, who, 
at least initially, were left without the means to 
do so. The gap in the response system was filled 
by the “Armed Forces and other forces and bod-
ies”, and these also benefitted. The new crisis 
management mechanisms were activated after 
some delay, incoherently, and chaotically. The 
devised political propaganda, which focused on 
the state’s successes in the fight against COVID-19, 
could not disguise the social reality. While, initially, 
stress was placed on the deliverance assured by 
the mobilisation strategy of a “besieged fortress”11, 
guaranteeing unity of the public and authorities 
in the face of a common threat, as the pandemic 
spread and Russians became increasingly weary 
of the crisis, the public mood deteriorated (one 
example of this is a protest that has been going 
for a number of weeks against the arrest of the 
governor of Khabarovsk Krai). 
A number of factors are behind this. Firstly, there is 
an increasing awareness that the highly developed 
system of oversight gives those subject to it and 
the authorities conducting oversight a great deal 
of discretion. Local officials (such as governors of 
hospitals) concentrated on shedding the burden 
of responsibility, by not disclosing the number of 
cases and lack of the means essential for fight-
ing the virus. In addition, in Russia, the nature 
of reporting is to confirm the stipulated figures, 
leading the heads of the regions to declare the 
same number of cases and a low COVID-19 sta-
tistical mortality rate every day, while the ‘forces 
ministry people’ reported activities performed 
for show and a “crime pandemic”: in Kazan, in 
First Quarter 2020, there was a recorded increase 
in crime of 20%, a terrorist attack was foiled in 
Khabarovsk, and the figures for counteracting 
extremism doubled12. Moreover, recently a ‘reg-
ulatory guillotine’ was set up, which operates 
selectively: in addition to information that on 
21 July the government passed nearly 200 piec-
es of legislation on EMERCOM fire safety over-
sight, there are also reports, for example, that 
11 I. Wiśniewska, ‘Russia and the coronavirus pandemic: in 
praise of the besieged fortress’, OSW, 18 March 2020, www.
osw.waw.pl.
12 ‘«Криминальная пандемия»: коронавирус поднял уро-
вень преступности в Татарстане на четверть’, Бизнес 
Online, 16 April 2020, www.business-gazeta.ru; И. Бакин, 
‘МВД отчиталось о росте более чем на 40% числа случа-
ев экстремизма в 2020 году’, Znak, 13 July 2020, www.
znak.com.
Although in the past it has been seen 
as a defence system, today military 
organisation of the state is becoming 
an important element of manage-
ment of the state.
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the Investigation Committee and Ministry of the 
Interior have begun work on amendments to the 
Criminal Code due to the increase in tax-related 
crime, which will definitely mean new opportu-
nities for tax inspection authorities. 
Secondly, the ‘forces ministries’ and firms with 
links to the ruling elite benefited from the pan-
demic. Independent journalists13 analysed 90,000 
public contracts for goods and services relating 
to the fight against COVID-19, concluded in Sec-
ond Quarter 2020 for a total of RUB 210 billion. 
One in ten of these contracts was given to the 
state-owned Rostech. Incomplete data (20% of 
tenders were kept secret) were compared against 
government grants for this purpose. In terms of 
the size of the grants, the Ministry of Defence is at 
the top of the list, coming higher than the health 
ministry and the Federal Medicine and Biology 
Agency (FMBA). The size of the grants given is 
a clear indication that they are discretionary (the 
Ministry of Defence was given RUB 13.4 billion, the 
Ministry of the Interior – 7.8, the President’s Of-
fice – 5.0, the prison service – 2.4, the FMBA – 2.5, 
Rosgvardiya – 1.9, EMERCOM – 1.3, and the Gen-
eral Prosecution Service – 1.0). Incidentally, these 
funds were not used for the intended purpose 
(for example, only RUB 1.5 billion of the awarded 
RUB 7.8 billion could be accounted for in Ministry 
of the Interior contracts).
The ‘forces ministries’ were given additional grants 
on numerous occasions. It is known, for example, 
that on 13 April the government granted, from 
the reserve fund, RUB 2.3 billion to the Minis-
try of Defence, RUB 21.8 million to Rosgvardiya, 
120.7 million to the FSB, and 223.4 million to the 
prison service. On 13 May, the Ministry of Defence 
received RUB 2.769 billion from that fund, Ros-
gvardiya – 92.4 million, the FSB – 334.08 million, 
and the President’s Office – 194.8 million. In addi-
13 Ю. Апухтина, Д. Сотников, ‘Кто заработал на коронавирусе 
больше всех’, Проект, 29 July 2020, www.proekt.media.
tion, on 27 May, RUB 2 billion were transferred to 
the defence ministry for construction of hospitals14.
Thirdly, the ‘forces ministries’ are focused on po-
litical tasks, such as obtaining the constitutional 
plebiscite outcome required by the Kremlin, or not 
allowing large-scale protest, and not social tasks. 
Their activities before and after the referendum 
varied. While beforehand it was suggested that 
the ‘firm hand’ had mysteriously disappeared, 
following the passing of amendments to the 
Constitution the machine of repression was reac-
tivated (for example the highly-publicised arrest 
of the governor of Khabarovsk Krai – officially for 
ordering a murder, unofficially for causing the 
party United Russia to become marginalised and 
as a warning to regional elites against possible 
disloyalty – and the journalist Ivan Safronov – for 
alleged espionage for the Czech security services). 
In addition, most of the grants for the health 
ministry and FMBA were earmarked for biotech-
nology – tests and a vaccine. This activity was 
mainly aimed at generating benefits through 
export, and for the publicity value (Russia was the 
first to register a coronavirus vaccine)15. 
Fourthly, the pandemic confirmed the poor per-
formance of state institutions, demonstrated by 
the selective manner in which the law is applied 
(referred to as ‘hybrid law’16). The pandemic broad-
ened the potential for corruption and abuse of 
office, for which quarantine restrictions create 
favourable conditions. For example, in Vladikavkaz, 
one cause of mass protest was the continued op-
eration of a brewery owned by the head of North 
Ossetia, while the other production plants were 
closed due to coronavirus. In Moscow, fines for 
violating lockdown, which were announced by 
way of text messages, were a potential area of 
abuse. Collection of these fines was suspended. 
14 Распоряжение Правительства Российской Федерации от 
13.04.2020 № 1006-р, Официальный интернет-портал 
правовой информации, www.pravo.gov.ru; Официаль-
ные документы, Стопкоронавирус.рф.
15 ‘Путин объявил о регистрации в России первой вакцины 
от коронавируса’, Известия, 11 August 2020, www.iz.ru.
16 Б. Вишневский, ‘Таинственное исчезновение «жесткой 
руки»’, Новая Газета, 31 March 2020, www.novayagazeta.ru.
The new crisis management mech-
anisms were activated after some 
delay, incoherently, and chaotically.
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Lastly, while the public can be fed the ‘propagan-
da of success’ on the part of the president, the 
members of the MO themselves are aware of the 
reality, and of inequality in the treatment of ele-
ments of the MO17. One of the ways in which the 
poor position of the Kremlin in the referendum in 
the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (the only region in 
which the amendments to the Constitution were 
rejected) is interpreted is that it was a result of the 
expectations of ‘forces ministry people’ not being 
met (in this region the number is above the nation-
al average, while salaries are lower than average 
pay in the defence ministry)18. Members of the 
uniformed forces in some constituency election 
committees in garrisons and ZATO (closed areas) 
demonstrated openly anti-Kremlin sentiment – 
in these areas, support for the amendments to 
the Constitution was at between 40% and 60%, 
compared to the national average of just under 
80%. This indicates that military personnel in the 
Ministry of Defence as well are not a unified group 
and do not support those in power unreservedly. 
This is a result of the dissonance between prop-
aganda and reality in the state19. 
Even though the outcome of the ‘pandemic test’ 
was not received well by the public, more test-
ing of the MO is likely, due to tension in foreign 
17 In January 2020, for example a 100% supplement was intro-
duced for police officers and Rosgvardiya officers for main-
taining public order. Установлены ежемесячные надбавки 
к окладу за сложность выполняемых задач сотрудникам 
ряда подразделений органов внутренних дел, военнос-
лужащим и сотрудникам Росгвардии, Правительство 
России, 24 January 2020, www.government.ru.
18 С. Савина, ‘Триумф боли. Исследование о том, сколько 
в России силовиков и много ли они получают’, Проект, 
19 February 2020, www.proekt.media.
19 П. Лузин, ‘Армия против Путина?’, Riddle, 7 July 2020, 
www.ridl.io/ru.
and domestic policy in Russia. Deviation from 
this concept for managing the state is not an 
option; it is an excellent instrument for wielding 
authoritarian power and an argument of good 
publicity all in one. The idea behind the MO of 
the state and society is that it will harmonise not 
only domestic security and external defence, but 
also the Kremlin’s social base. As there are no 
official data, only an approximation is possible – 
depending on the methodology used, experts 
estimate it to be 7–12 million people20. The website 
Riddle includes in this group for example 2 million 
state and municipal officials, 1 million military 
personnel, 1 million civil employees in the Armed 
Forces, approximately 1 million police officers 
and interior ministry employees, approximately 
1 million officers in security services and bodies, 
and also 5.8 million employees of the state. It is 
normal that this will not be a homogenous base. 
Not all of the members benefit from the system: 
the government in Russia is increasing the incomes 
of people in the uniformed forces, but it is not 
capable of ensuring regional officials a compara-
ble standard of living. 
To summarise, the Kremlin treats the MO as a pan-
acea for any inconvenient issues, and above all 
as a platform for consolidating and mobilising 
the ‘forces ministries’ in times of crisis (political, 
financial, social crisis). These crises were emerging 
even before the pandemic, and were confirmed 
in a telling manner by the haste in which the 
amendments to the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation were drawn up.
20 See i.e. П. Лузин, ‘Корпоративный «федерализм»’, Riddle, 
29 August 2019, www.ridl.io/ru; С. Савина, ‘Триумф боли. 
Исследование…’, op. cit.
